Stepping Up and Going Public: How the FCC and Team Telecom Could Take a Cue from the Antitrust Bar to Promote National Security in the Telecommunications Sector
The communications industry has faced a host of national security issues in recent years – and not just with respect to cybersecurity. In 2019, numerous rural telecommunications providers learned that the inexpensive Chinese-made Huawei and ZTE equipment installed in their networks in fact posed a national security risk – and had to be ripped out at enormous expense.²
In 2022, an international hacking group conducted a cyberattack on an unnamed submarine cable provider in Hawaii, which was ultimately foiled by the Department of Homeland Security.³
In October 2024, the Salt Typhoon hacking group backed by the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) conducted a “significant cyber espionage campaign” by infiltrating the systems of at least eight U.S. telecommunications providers.⁴
More recent congressional inquiries call into question whether widespread consumer use of broadband routers made by PRC-linked firm TP-Link could present yet another national security crisis for the telecom industry.⁵
These events have triggered a policy debate as to whether additional national security regulations of the telecommunications industry – such as cybersecurity – are warranted. But regulations change with each presidential administration, and can take forever to develop and enforce. This author favors such regulation, when (and if) it happens. But in the meantime, we need to find an alternative path to boost national security know-how – quickly – to everyone in the communications sector, including consumers.
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) do a great job of doing this with respect to antitrust. They do this through the publication of the FTC-DOJ Merger Guidelines (Guidelines), which describe the legal and economic framework that both agencies use to determine whether a transaction violates antitrust law. Though industry may kick and scream about how much they dislike the Guidelines, the fact is that this tool provides everyone – industry players large and small, state and local enforcers, and consumers – with some antitrust know-how from the nation’s experts.
In this author’s view, the Guidelines offer greater benefits outside of their intended purpose. Armed with the Guidelines, small, under-resourced private organizations who have no interest in merging with anyone can nonetheless glean valuable know-how from the Guidelines to make more informed, pro-competitive decisions and assessments of their business dealings. Small customers of merging companies can more intelligently explain to antitrust agencies how a transaction under investigation impacts competition in their market. Regulatory agencies use the Guidelines when doing their own merger work, and have even referenced the Guidelines when developing broad, competition-based policy. And the Guidelines frequently serve as a source of academic debate. These outside uses of the Guidelines are not the reason why they were written, but they have become highly influential.
Given the current national security crisis in the communications industry, it’s about time for Team Telecom, the national security watchdog of the communications industry, to step up and go public with Team Telecom Guidelines of its own.
01 — Background: Why Team Telecom Matters
Team Telecom protects the digital infrastructure that powers artificial intelligence in the United States. Artificial intelligence relies heavily on vast amounts of data. So when Big Tech needs to land a submarine cable in the United States to move bulk data around the globe, or when a broadband provider connecting data centers across the country attracts foreign investment, winning Team Telecom’s approval is typically an essential first step in making that happen.
Team Telecom is the federal entity that assesses national security and law enforcement risk (“risk assessment”) arising from foreign participation (i.e. investment or otherwise) in the communications industry. Team Telecom’s official name is the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Sector, and it operated for years before becoming formally established in 2020 through Executive Order 13913.⁶
Appropriate to its mission, the voting members of Team Telecom are the main law enforcement and national security agencies of the United States: the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the Department of Defense (“DOD”).⁷ DOJ’s participation in Team Telecom traces back, in part, to its experience in criminal law and law enforcement, including through its work with the FBI. (Team Telecom was housed in DOJ’s Criminal Division for years before being transferred to the National Security Division when it was established in 2006.)⁸ DHS is the expert agency on cybersecurity and ensuring the security and resiliency of critical infrastructure, including with respect to the communications industry.⁹ And the DOD is obviously all-knowing on the military, national security, and intelligence front.¹⁰
Team Telecom’s job is to make recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) as to whether granting (or continuing to allow) an FCC authorization involving foreign investment is consistent with the Communication Act’s public interest standard.¹¹ The FCC has articulated that the standard encompasses a variety of considerations in its decision as to whether to grant an authorization – including national security.¹² The FCC makes the final decision as to whether the authorization is in the public interest and should be granted.
This author is not aware of an instance in which the FCC has disagreed with a Team Telecom recommendation. In other words, if a foreign-owned telco wants a license to operate in the United States – it needs to get Team Telecom’s blessing.
02 — Team Telecom’s Paper Trail Highlights Certain National Security Themes
Team Telecom does leave a public trail that provides at least some insight into its thinking. This is through the public recommendations that it transmits to the FCC. For those applications in which Team Telecom finds national security risk, it will either recommend FCC approval subject to an agreement to mitigate that risk or it will recommend FCC denial.¹³ It has a similar function with respect to previously-granted FCC approvals, such that it can recommend modifications to, or revocation of, that approval.¹⁴
When Team Telecom assesses risk in an application that can be mitigated, it will recommend that the FCC approve the application conditioned on a mitigation agreement. Team Telecom has even developed a package of remedies designed to address law enforcement and national security risk in most situations, which it refers to as “standard” mitigation. Team Telecom has the ability to change standard mitigation over time.¹⁵ A close review of standard mitigation terms highlights four basic security themes.¹⁶
First, the firm seeking Team Telecom’s blessing must establish and implement a security plan that encompasses physical and logical security (to include cybersecurity) – and typically get that plan approved by Team Telecom.
Second, the firm must implement processes to adequately screen personnel who have access to critical parts of the communications network, or key equipment, or U.S. person data (such as personally identifiable information). In some instances, personnel must also be screened by Team Telecom.
Third, the firm must obtain Team Telecom approval before hiring certain new vendors or contractors, or before buying certain types of communications equipment.
Fourth, the firm must allow Team Telecom to conduct site visits to ensure that the firm is operating in accordance with the terms of its mitigation.¹⁷
In short, these terms suggest that having physical and logical security and thorough screening of personnel, vendors, equipment and contractors are not just sound practice – they can help mitigate national security risk.
In instances when standard mitigation is insufficient, Team Telecom will include additional mitigation requirements on a case-by-case basis. (Team Telecom creatively terms this “non-standard” mitigation.) Two examples of this kind of mitigation are from submarine cable cases. Submarine cables are significant forms of internet infrastructure that carry almost 97 percent of global internet traffic.¹⁸ One of those cases was from 2021, and required Meta and Google to conduct annual assessments of risk to sensitive data transiting the Pacific Light Cable Network (“PLCN”) system that connects the United States, Taiwan and the Philippines.¹⁹
More expansive non-standard provisions dedicated to protecting data transiting submarine cables were included in the 2025 mitigation agreement for Google’s Taiwan-Philippines-USA submarine cable.²⁰
Team Telecom’s public denials highlight instances in which national security risk is so significant that it cannot be mitigated. This was the case in Google and Facebook’s 2020 application for the PLCN submarine cable that would have directly connected the United States to Hong Kong; and in ARCOS-1 USA Inc. and A.SurNet Inc.’s application to modify the ARCOS-1 Cable system to add an additional segment connecting the United States through a new landing station in Cojimar, Cuba.²¹ Common themes in both denials included Team Telecom’s concerns about the potential for foreign adversary governments like China and Cuba to access sensitive U.S. data traversing the cables and the increased likelihood that data traffic would be routed through Cuba and China.
On occasion, Team Telecom will even weigh in on FCC proceedings that focus on national security issues. Team Telecom comments have included their views about how to increase national security oversight of international telecommunications services (i.e. international 214 licenses)²² and submarine cables.²³ Snippets of these filings include:
On International Telecommunications Services: The FCC “should encourage, if not require, all International §214 authorization holders to implement and adhere to baseline security measures…. In particular, the U.S. government would benefit from periodic certification by all International §214 authorization holders that they have implemented minimum-security requirements to protect U.S. records, domestic communications, and domestic communications infrastructure;”²⁴
On Submarine Cables: “Foreign ownership of applicants themselves, is not the only potential risk to U.S. interests. The Committee submits that the locations for both licensee and service provider employee remote access and control of submarine cable systems are highly relevant to U.S. national security and law enforcement interests. For example, a U.S.-owned company could use staff in a foreign adversary jurisdiction to remotely monitor and operate a cable system.”²⁵
Through the mitigation agreements, denials, and FCC comments described above, Team Telecom does highlight its national security priorities.
03 — Despite Its Public Availability, Team Telecom’s Work Is Not Transparent
The public nature of Team Telecom’s work holds great promise for addressing the communications industry’s national security crisis. If you pore through their filings, you can access a good chunk of its views on law enforcement and national security in the communications sector. This is great for those firms who want to prepare for Team Telecom review of a transaction. It’s also good for others seeking an unfiltered view from the U.S. government’s national security experts on how to mitigate or avoid national security risk in the communications sector.
However, it takes an extraordinary amount of familiarity with FCC process, and deft navigation of the FCC’s website, international, and domestic docket databases to access these public materials. For example, most applications subject to Team Telecom review are uploaded into the FCC’s international filing system – whereas others are sometimes uploaded into the domestic filing system even when foreign ownership is involved.²⁶ Figuring out when to use which database is not for the faint of heart. And even though Big Tech firms like Meta and Amazon are major players in the submarine cable industry²⁷ – it’s almost impossible to find their applications without the 10-or-more-digit file number assigned to them by FCC staff. (For example, when this author typed in “Amazon” or “Meta” in the “company name” field of the FCC’s International Comment Filing System, it yielded no results.) DOJ press releases in the PLCN and ARCOS denials attempted to help the public overcome this issue by providing detailed instructions, with file numbers and links to the relevant databases.²⁸
As far as finding Team Telecom’s comments in an FCC proceeding, these are typically found in the domestic database. However, unless you’re already monitoring that particular docket, you would not know that Team Telecom submitted a filing unless there’s a press release. In addition, Team Telecom comments can only be found by searching for the name of a different agency (the National Telecommunications and Information Agency) that, for bureaucratic reasons,²⁹ files the document on Team Telecom’s behalf.
In short, accessing Team Telecom’s public filings is a real challenge for those who do not have a dedicated team for that task. And without access to this information, it is hard to suss out Team Telecom’s priorities. One way to address that would be to issue a consolidated set of Team Telecom National Security Guidelines, published on each Team Telecom voting member agency’s website, similar to what the federal antitrust agencies have been doing for years.
04 — How the FTC/DOJ Merger Guidelines Can Serve as a Model for Team Telecom
For years, the DOJ’s Antitrust Division and the FTC have taken it upon themselves to consolidate their views on how to assess whether a merger violates antitrust law by publishing the Guidelines. This is in large part due to the fact that the primary law governing antitrust merger enforcement – Section 7 of the Clayton Act – instructs the agencies to assess whether the effect of a merger may be to “substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”³⁰ This mandate is quite broad. Through issuance of the Guidelines, DOJ and FTC have developed a mechanism to show the courts and industry how they implement this broad mandate.³¹
The FTC and DOJ accomplish this in the antitrust world through highlighting their priorities in the Guidelines. The current version (the 2023 Guidelines) has four such provisions. First, the agencies define what they mean when they use the term “competition,” as this definition has changed over various iterations of the Guidelines.³² By defining what the agencies currently mean when they use the term “competition,” this gives merging parties a heads up on what to expect in a merger investigation, and how to prepare. Second, the Guidelines identify frameworks, such as measures of concentration – the extent to which a few firms dominate a market – that may be used to identify potentially problematic transactions. This is followed by a description of how the agencies apply these frameworks in specific settings. Third, the Guidelines describe the kind of evidence that merging parties can offer to rebut an inference of potential harm under the frameworks. And lastly, the Guidelines discuss some of the analytical, economic, and evidentiary tools the Agencies use to evaluate facts, understand the risk of harm to competition, and define relevant markets. Armed with this information, merging parties have at least some guidance from the antitrust agencies as to whether they think a transaction is consistent with the law.
The Guidelines have evolved over time to deal with new antitrust legal and economic thinking, as well as emerging markets (especially with respect to the technology sector). The Guidelines got their start with a solo document from the DOJ in 1968, with no public input involved. Commentators have said that DOJ issued them primarily to communicate to industry and the courts that it wanted to tamp down a trend towards challenging mergers with really low levels of market concentration.³³ The Reagan DOJ revised the 1968 document in 1982 to make it more merger friendly.³⁴ The FTC agreed to give the 1982 DOJ document “considerable weight” in its own decision making, based in part on the advice of teams of FTC and DOJ lawyers and economists, and after it “solicited and carefully examined the views of the private bar, the academic and business communities, as well as the public at large.”³⁵
The Guidelines are now a joint FTC-DOJ effort that has been updated periodically – in 1992, 1997, 2010 and 2023 – and includes an opportunity for public comment. Each iteration has built on prior versions and attempts to address the evolving nature of the industries under their review. Each iteration has also contained non-binding language, to give the FTC and DOJ flexibility to change course if the circumstances warrant.³⁶ Examples of how each version of the Guidelines builds on the other is in 2010, when the Guidelines fleshed out how the agencies examined a merger’s impact on single firm behavior (as opposed to collusion), a concept first introduced in the 1992 Guidelines.³⁷ The 2010 Guidelines also devoted an entire section to analyzing a merger’s impact on innovation – which notably came on the heels of FTC actions against Intel.³⁸ The 2023 Guidelines are very different from the 2010 version, but some relics of the old version remain. And the 2023 Guidelines have introduced theories obviously designed to deal with the agencies’ current cases against Big Tech, such as the notion of examining a “series of multiple acquisitions” in one case, or examining various aspects of platform competition.³⁹
Merging parties who pay heed to the principles established in the Guidelines stand a better chance of obtaining approval for their merger than those who ignore the Guidelines. Most firms seeking antitrust approval want it quickly, and without the expense of litigation. In instances when the antitrust agencies nevertheless challenge a merger, many courts pay attention to the Guidelines as well.⁴⁰
This has been a benefit of the Guidelines in antitrust, in that they incorporate the antitrust agencies’ latest thinking in one document that is easily accessible to all. To state the obvious, this is tremendously helpful to smaller organizations that do not have access to – or the money to pay for – a team of antitrust specialists. It’s not that the antitrust agencies are trying to hide the theories they use to evaluate mergers, it’s just that you really need to know where to look – or who to talk to in order to get their insights. For example, court decisions in fully litigated cases will often include lengthy descriptions of the government’s theories of the case – more can be found in the government’s legal briefs and economic expert testimony (assuming you can decipher what the expert is saying). Consent decrees can also shed some light on the theories the agency relied on to get the merging parties to the negotiating table. But constant monitoring of merger cases, briefs, and consents is time consuming and resource intensive. Getting the agencies’ antitrust know-how through Guidelines is far more accessible to small players.
The Guidelines have also influenced how regulatory agencies evaluate competition for purposes of their own merger approvals, as well as industry-wide rules. The FCC, for example, has followed Guidelines’ theories in numerous merger decisions and competition-related rulemakings.⁴¹ (This author was particularly reliant on the Guidelines throughout her time at the FCC.) The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has been following certain aspects of 1992 Guidelines for purposes of reviewing horizontal transactions involving public utilities and when utilities seek authorization to charge based on market conditions.⁴²
In other words, if you want antitrust merger approval – ignore the Guidelines at your own risk. If you are a generalist judge or policy wonk seeking guidance on a merger case or competition policy, read the Guidelines. If you are a customer of merging firms trying to figure out how the agencies may evaluate the merger’s impact in your market, read the Guidelines. Team Telecom has the equivalent expertise in law enforcement and national security that the FTC and DOJ have in antitrust. Industry, policymakers, and consumers would greatly benefit from accessing Team Telecom’s expertise through public guidelines.
05 — Team Telecom National Security Guidelines
Team Telecom National Security Guidelines would obviously be different than the Guidelines – and somewhat less transparent. This is because despite the public nature of its filings, there are aspects of Team Telecom’s analyses (i.e. intelligence) that just cannot (and should not) be shared. However, for those parts of a Team Telecom recommendations that are in the public domain anyway, there’s no reason why that information could not be consolidated into Team Telecom National Security Guidelines.
The fact that Team Telecom is a required step in an FCC approval process gives its views heightened prominence and carries a significant amount of weight in the communications industry. Sure, DOJ, DOD and DHS component agencies, such as the National Security Agency (of DOD), Federal Bureau of Investigation (of DOJ), and CISA (of DHS) provide volumes of excellent and timely public materials designed to educate all industries of potential system vulnerabilities that could be compromised by bad actors.⁴³ However, those materials, which are constantly being updated, can be overwhelming for smaller, under-resourced organizations and consumers to sift through and/or discern which are the most important and/or apply to the communications sector. Moreover, they do not carry the same weight with the communications industry as guidance from the national security advisor of the federal regulator who oversees them.
For starters, this author would suggest the following be included in Team Telecom National Security Guidelines:
1. Explain Team Telecom’s Mandate
A lot of people have heard of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), but few have heard of Team Telecom. Team Telecom should take the opportunity to introduce itself to the broader community. It should explain that its national security expertise helps the nation’s communications regulator decide whether firms with a certain level of foreign involvement (investment or otherwise) should operate in the United States. It should contrast its mandate with CFIUS, and explain how now even the historically secretive CFIUS is starting to make some of its views – and enforcement actions – known to the public.⁴⁴
2. Define National Security
Similar to how the antitrust agencies define competition, Team Telecom should define what it means by the term “national security” in the communications sector. As noted Team Telecom’s predecessor noted: “In 2007, the U.S. Intelligence community’s top concern was terrorism… By 2019, the world had changed: cyber issues are listed at the top of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s (“ODNI”) worldwide threat assessment, and China is the first country identified by name for its persistent economic espionage and growing threat to core military and critical infrastructure systems.”⁴⁵
If ODNI’s public threat assessment⁴⁶ is a tool used to inform Team Telecom’s views on national security, why not say it?
3. Explain What a National Security Risk Assessment Is
Team Telecom should also explain what a “risk assessment” is. That is, after all, what the president, pursuant to E.O. 13913, requires Team Telecom to do for FCC applications under its review. It is not a state secret, it’s a method of analysis that also happens to be defined in the (public) Code of Federal Regulations.⁴⁷ If there’s a concern about sharing too much about this process, it can be done in very broad-brush strokes. That said, Team Telecom should highlight the importance of vulnerabilities – such as a poor cybersecurity or insufficient vetting of vendors. These are important issues for any communications firm to address, regardless of whether foreign investment is involved. This discussion would also likely influence federal policymakers.
4. Explain Standard Mitigation
Relatedly, Team Telecom should also provide an overview of standard mitigation and why Team Telecom believes it is an important tool for mitigating national security risk. Like the Guidelines, Team Telecom could also take the opportunity to provide more insights, such as further clarification of standard mitigations that are commonly misunderstood.
5. Identify Public National Security Resources
Team Telecom could also provide a list of national security resources available to the public, such as the NSA, FBI and CISA advisories noted above. This list could also include other public resources that could inform vendor selection and supply chain, such as the FCC’s Covered List (which identifies communications equipment that poses a national security risk) and DOD’s 1260H List (which identifies firms in the United States that are potentially supporting China’s military-civil fusion strategy).⁴⁸ Though many communications firms may already be aware of these resources – others may not. Moreover, large broadband customers – such as states and local governments, may find them helpful as well.
Some may argue that it is inappropriate for Team Telecom to provide the above topics or other information in Team Telecom National Security Guidelines because it would give a roadmap to foreign adversaries. That is wrong for two reasons. First, as discussed in detail above – a good chunk of Team Telecom decision making documents are already publicly available. So major law firms and large companies who track Team Telecom closely already know Team Telecom’s policy priorities. All of this gives the big organizations, those with money and staffing to devote to Team Telecom, great insights. Issuing Team Telecom National Security Guidelines will therefore not increase foreign adversaries’ visibility into the Team Telecom process. Moreover, this author is not suggesting that Team Telecom solicit public comment on Team Telecom National Security Guidelines – that would be a bridge too far. Instead, it would give a broader community easy access to Team Telecom’s expertise – particularly smaller firms without a security staff of their own, policymakers, and large under-resourced broadband customers (like school districts). In addition, this author notes that other national security entities – even CFIUS – are starting to see the benefits of going public.⁴⁹
Second, ensuring the national security of our nation’s communications networks is an all-hands-on-deck exercise. In the communications sector, this means that big companies with a national presence have to be mindful of strengthening their own systems – so do small firms. However, the challenge for any small firm is finding the funding and staff to juggle multiple priorities. This is especially true for smaller players who face a host of the same security concerns as their larger brethren, but have fewer resources. Our foreign adversaries know this too – there’s a reason why Huawei and ZTE sold their equipment to small providers in rural areas, some of which just happened to be located close to sensitive military installations. National security in today’s environment also involves end users, especially large customers of broadband services that may be buying some of their own equipment to save a buck, or consumers choosing a secure broadband router for their home. Given this context, Team Telecom Guidelines have the potential to close the resource gap between large sophisticated players – and everyone else.
06 — Conclusion
As an area of policy, national security has always been a bit of a black box. People think of it as the exclusive domain of military leaders, spies, and guys in grey suits with fancy titles from the National Security Council. This approach to national security will not get us where we need to go. In today’s age of advanced technologies, remote operations, cyber warfare and artificial intelligence, a lot of national security in the communications sphere hinges on the conduct of large enterprises, small operators – and even consumers (like military spouses shopping for the best new home router at the local Best Buy).
So we need an all-hands on deck approach to promoting national security in the communications sector. Pay attention to cybersecurity. Know your vendor. Make sure that cool new Internet gadget is not listed on the Covered List – before you buy. Don’t buy systems and software from foreign adversaries, and definitely don’t let foreign adversaries remote into your system. This is the sort of common-sense approach to national security that Team Telecom has already articulated publicly, but to a very narrow, well-heeled audience. It’s time for Team Telecom to step up and go public by taking a cue from the antitrust agencies and issuing Team Telecom National Security Guidelines.
This Insight was originally published in Competition Policy International’s TechREG Chronicle, July 2025.
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In re Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain Through FCC Programs Huawei Designation ZTE Designation, Docket 19-351, FCC Report and Order, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd 11423 (2019).
AJ Vincens, DHS Investigators Say They Foiled Cyberattack on Undersea Internet Cable in Hawaii, CYBERSCOOP (April 13, 2022).
Press Release, Cybersecurity Infrastructure and Security Agency, Joint Statement from FBI and CISA on the People’s Republic of China Targeting of Commercial Telecommunications Infrastructure (November 13, 2024).
Ryan Chua, U.S. Lawmakers Urge Ban on China-Linked Router Maker TP-Link, Bloomberg (May 14, 2025).
Establishing the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Sector, Exec. Order 13913, 85 FR 19643 (April 8, 2020) (Team Telecom E.O.). Prior to this Executive Order’s formal establishment of Team Telecom, the FCC had solicited the national security and law enforcement views of these agencies on an informal basis. See Process Reform for Executive Branch Review of Certain FCC Applications and Petitions Involving Foreign Ownership, IB Docket No. 16-155, FCC Report and Order, 35 FCC Rcd 10927, 10928-34 (2020) (Executive Branch Review Order).
The Team Telecom E.O. requires Team Telecom to solicit the views of additional agencies, called Committee Advisors, on major cases that involve non-routine matters, such as recommendations to block an acquisition. However, DOJ, DHS and DOD are the agencies performing the risk analysis to assess whether a case is in fact major. See Team Telecom E.O., §§ 9(c) & (f). Committee Advisors are: the Secretaries of State, Commerce and Treasury, the Directors of the Offices of Management and Budget and Technology Policy, the Director of National Intelligence, the Administrator of the General Services Administration, the Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and Economic Policy, the United States Trade Representative and the Chair of Economic Advisors.
See DOJ Organization Mission and Functions Manual: National Security Division (NSD), https://www.justice.gov/doj/national-security-division (last visited July 5, 2025); see also DOJ NSD FY 2009 Performance Budget: Congressional Submission, 7, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2013/10/04/fy09-nsd.pdf (last visited July 5, 2025).
DHS responsibilities in critical infrastructure are derived from its previous responsibilities under Presidential Policy Directive 21, which has since been replaced by a 2024 National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. 2024 National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience: CISA Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, https://www.cisa.gov/national-security-memorandum-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience (last visited Jul 5, 2025).
Our Story: U.S. Department of Defense, https://www.defense.gov/About/ (last visited Jul 5, 2025).
See Team Telecom E.O., § 3; see also Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a) & 310(d).
Executive Branch Review Order, 35 FCC Rcd at 10928-29, para. 3 (noting that the Commission affirmed that it would consider national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and trade policy concerns in its public interest analysis).
Team Telecom E.O. § 9(a)(ii)-(iii).
Team Telecom E.O. § 9(b)(i)-(iii).
The Team Telecom E.O. required Team Telecom to develop mitigation measures that are considered to be routine – termed “standard mitigation.” Team Telecom E.O. § 11. In 2024, President Biden tasked Team Telecom with updating standard mitigation for submarine cables. Preventing Access to Americans’ Bulk Sensitive Personal Data and United States Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern, Exec. Order No. 14117 § 3, 89 Fed. Reg. 15421 (Feb. 28, 2024).
The author based this overview on four public mitigation agreements that the public FCC docket indicated were not subject to a secondary assessment. The secondary assessment process is invoked in applications undergoing initial review, pursuant to Team Telecom § 5, that involve risk that cannot be mitigated with standard mitigation alone (or cannot be mitigated at all). When a case undergoing initial review is subject to secondary assessment, Team Telecom files a notice to that effect in the FCC’s public database. Team Telecom E.O. §§ 5(c), 9(f).
This list provides a high-level overview only, there are additional provisions in standard mitigation not addressed here.
Madison S. Long, Information Warfare in the Depths: An Analysis of Global Undersea Networks, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE (May 2023).
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Team Telecom Recommends FCC Grant Google and Meta Licenses for Undersea Cable (Dec. 17, 2021).
See National Security Agreement Between GU Holdings and Team Telecom Member Agencies, FCC File No. SCL-LIC-20230511-00013 (Jan. 28, 2025).
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Team Telecom Recommends that the FCC Deny Pacific Light Cable Network System’s Hong Kong Undersea Cable Connection to the United States (June 17, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/team-telecom-recommends-fcc-deny-pacific-light-cable-network-system-s-hong-kong-undersea; see also GU Holdings Inc., Edge Cable Holdings USA, LLC and Pacific Light Data Communication Co. Ltd, Application for a License to Construct, Land, and Operate an Undersea Fiber Optic Cable Connecting the United States, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Philippines, Executive Branch Recommendation for a Partial Denial and Partial Grant of the Application for a Submarine Cable Landing License for the Pacific Light Cable Network, FCC ICFS No. SCL-LIC-20170421-00012 et seq. (June 17, 2020) (PLCN Denial Press Release); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Team Telecom Recommends the FCC Deny Application to Directly Connect the United States to Cuba Through Subsea Cable (Nov. 30, 2022); ARCOS-1 USA, Inc. and A.Surnet Inc., Application for a Modification to Cable Landing License, Recommendation of the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Services Sector to Deny the Application, FCC ICFS File No. SCL-MOD-20210928-00039 (Nov. 29, 2022).
Review of International Section 214 Authorizations to Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks, Comments of the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Sector, FCC Docket 23-119 (April 12, 2023) (Team Telecom Int’l 214 Comments).
Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures to Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks, Reply Comments of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration: § IV, Response of Committee, pgs. 12-33 (May 19, 2025) (Team Telecom Portion of NTIA Reply in FCC Submarine Cable Rulemaking).
Team Telecom Int’l 214 Comments at 5.
Team Telecom Portion of NTIA Submarine Cable Reply at 26.
See FCC International Communications Filing System (for international applications) versus FCC Electronic Comment Filing System (for primarily domestic filings and for rulemakings). Those who want to track transactions that involve domestic and international licenses, and that have been referred to Team Telecom, need to track both databases. Those who want to track broadcast applications that involve foreign ownership and have been referred to Team Telecom typically can only find those applications through ECFS.
A (refreshed) List of Content Providers’ Submarine Cable Holdings, TeleGeography’s Official Blog (last visited July 6, 2025).
PLCN Denial Press Release; ARCOS Denial Press Release.
Team Telecom E.O. § 9(h) (tasking NTIA with the duty of filing Team Telecom’s filings in FCC databases).
Section 7 of the Clayton Act is found at 15 U.S.C. §18.
Merger Guidelines, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (Dec. 18, 2023) (noting that the FTC and DOJ enforce Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2; Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45; and Sections 3, 7, and 8 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18, 19) (2023 Guidelines).
See 2023 Guidelines at 1 (defining competition as: “a process of rivalry that incentivizes businesses to offer lower prices, improve wages and working conditions, enhance quality and resiliency, innovate, and expand choice, among many other benefits”).
An oft-cited example of market concentration overkill was one in which the Supreme Court condemned a transaction for which the merged firm would only have had a 7.5 percent share of a competitive Los Angeles grocery market. See Daniel Francis, The 2023 Merger Guidelines and the Arc of Antitrust History, 39 Journal of Economic Perspectives 1, 6-7 (Winter 2025) (citing United States vs. Von’s Grocery, 384 US 270, 278 (1966)); see also Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse, 48 William and Mary Law Review 3, 783 (2006) (noting that by current standards, the Von’s Grocery post-merger increase in concentration was relatively insignificant, and that Justice Stewart’s Von’s Grocery dissent criticized the majority overly restrictive views for essentially supporting a standard in which the government “always wins” in merger litigation).
See Francis, supra note 33 at 9.
Statement of Federal Trade Commission Concerning Horizontal Mergers (June 1982).
2023 Guidelines at §1; see also 1968 DOJ Guidelines § 1 (noting that “these guidelines are announced solely as a statement of current Department policy, subject to change at any time without prior notice”); 1982 DOJ Guidelines § 1 (noting that “some exceptions are inevitable”); 1984 DOJ Guidelines §1, 1992 Guidelines § 0, 1997 Guidelines § 0 (noting that mechanical application may sometimes lead to misleading answers so the DOJ and FTC will apply the standards “reasonably and flexibly”) (emphasis added); 2010 Guidelines at Section 1 (noting that “merger analysis does not consist of uniform application of a single methodology. Rather, it is a fact-specific process through which the Agencies, guided by their extensive experience, apply a range of analytical tools to the reasonably available and reliable evidence to evaluate competitive concerns… Where these Guidelines provide examples, they are illustrative and do not exhaust the applications of the relevant principle”).
This marked an important shift from previous thought that, when an “economic approach is taken in a Section 7 case, the ultimate issue is whether the challenged acquisition is likely to facilitate collusion.” Carl Shapiro & Harold Shelanski, Judicial Response to the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 58 Review of Industrial Organization 1, 67 (January 2021).
Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Settles Charges of Anticompetitive Conduct Against Intel: Provisions are Designed to Foster Competition in the Computer Chip Business (Aug. 4, 2010).
2023 Guidelines § 2.
The Guidelines… are not self-enforcing. While the agencies may explain how they will evaluate mergers and bring challenges based on the Guidelines, it is up to the courts to determine whether they are reasonable and should be followed. Although the Guidelines are not binding on courts, courts have found past guidelines persuasive and have generally accepted them as an accurate statement of the law. The New Merger Guidelines: Reflections After One Year, Steptoe (Dec. 20, 2024). Antitrust literature backs this claim up. For example, in 2021, a pair of well-known antitrust scholars analyzed court decisions in merger cases issued after the 2010 Guidelines. With respect to 21 of those decisions, the courts directly addressed unilateral effects claims – a key point of emphasis in the 2010 Guidelines – in ten of those decisions. Shapiro, supra note 37 at 67.
See T-Mobile-Sprint Merger, Docket 18-197, FCC Order, 34 FCC Rcd 10578, 10601-10611, paras. 55, 79 (2019) (citing to the 2010 Guidelines in explaining its approach to market definition and competitive effects); see also Verizon-Tracfone Merger, Docket 21-112, FCC Order, 36 FCC Rcd 16994, 17006, paras. 33-34 (2021) (citing to 2010 Guidelines in evaluating competitive effects); FCC Tariff Investigation, Docket 16-54, FCC Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 31 FCC Rcd 4723, 4813, 4822-23 paras. 207, 224 (2016) (evaluating market definition and entry for a rulemaking based on 2010 Guidelines frameworks); FCC Quadrennial Ownership Review: Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Docket 18-349, FCC Report and Order, 38 FCC Rcd 12782, 12828-29, para. 86 (2023) (deciding against adopting rules that would allow a single firm to own 2 or more of the Top 4 broadcast stations in a market based in part based on a 2010 Guidelines market concentration analysis that showed that “the majority of television markets are already highly concentrated”).
Energy Regulatory Alert: FERC Reaffirms Current Horizontal Market Power Guidelines, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Feb. 3, 2012); see also FERC Merger Policy Statement, Order No. 592, 61 FR 68595 (1996); Analysis of Horizontal Mkt. Power Under the Fed. Power Act, 138 FERC ¶ 61,109 (2012).
For example, the National Security Agency issues cybersecurity advisories and guidance on its website that provides information on cybersecurity threats from foreign adversaries and guidance and information sheets on a variety of topics of interest to the telecommunications industry such as security considerations for edge devices and selecting a protective DNS service. The FBI’s website has a whole section devoted to cybercrime and advises industry to stay current by signing up for alerts on cybercrime matters on the Internet Crime Complaint Center. CISA publishes in-depth cybersecurity advisories, shorter alerts on various cyber topics (such as mitigations fixes that vendors publish), concise summaries of advisories concerning industrial control systems (i.e. the hardware and software used to monitor, control and automate telecommunications networks) and analysis reports that provide an in-depth analysis of a new or evolving cyberthreat. Many advisories were issued jointly by all three of these entities.
CFIUS rolled out a new enforcement website last year and identified several firms that had violated the terms of their mitigation agreements. It also issued its first ever enforcement and penalty guidelines.
Executive Branch Recommendation to Revoke and Terminate China Telecom International 214 License, FCC ICFS File No. ITC-214-20010613-00346 at 2 (April 9, 2020).
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (March 2025).
31 C.F.R. §800.102.
FCC Covered List; DOD 1260H List.
See supra, note 44.